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MUNICIPAL BONDS-THE NEED FOR
DISCLOSURE
I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal securities have long been thought of as an ideal
form of financing for the issuer and the perfect investment for the
purchaser. From the issuer's point of view, it is generally thought
(although not completely true)' that, unlike corporate securities
issues, no registration with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion under the Securities Act of 19332 (1933 Act) and no continuing
disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Act of
19341 (1934 Act) are imposed. As seen from the purchaser's side of
the transaction, no federal income tax is assessed on the dividends
derived from the municipal securities,4 and many states also de-
cline to tax the dividends from securities issued by one of their own
political sub-divisions or agencies.5
However, for the purchaser to gain the tax exemption by buy-
ing municipal securities, he must give up his right to the free flow
of information demanded by the 1933 and 1934 Acts for almost all
other types of securities.6 This lack of information can possibly
lead to fraud or the intentional or unintentional withholding of
important information on the part of the issuer, the very thing the
legislation was designed to prevent.7 An action for fraud has been
filed against the City of New York and certain of its officials follow-
ing its recent financial difficulties8 and a quiet investigation by the
I See text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
2 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2). (1970).
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 103(a)(1) provides:
(a) General rule-Gross income does not include interest on-
(1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a possession of the
United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing,
or of the District of Columbia ....
5 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-16-11 (1976).
1 See text accompanying notes 118-127 infra.
7 The preamble to the 1933 Act reads: "To provide full and fair disclosure of
the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Act of May
27, 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74. The 1934 Act devotes an entire section to the reasons
for regulation including "to require appropriate reports and to impose requirements
necessary . . . and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets ....
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. 78b (1970).
8 Abrams v. The City of New York, No. 75 Civil 3981 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13,
1975).
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SEC has been launched on this same matter.' Occurrences of this
type raise the question of whether political issuers of securities
should be exempted from informing the purchaser, through a com-
plete disclosure of material information, of exactly what he owns
or is buying.
Since most people are unfamiliar with the structure of the
industry, the point of departure is to identify the municipal securi-
ties market by defining the types of securities involved and the
parties to the transaction. Next, the present regulations (or lack
of them) applicable to this market and the reasons for their ab-
sence will be presented. Third, a consideration of the possible con-
stitutional limitations will be shown, followed by the basic ques-
tion of whether there should be any regulation. A discussion of
what is presently possible, through direct and indirect means,
under the present legislation will then be presented, followed by a
consideration of the relationship of the present requirements for
corporate securities and possible requirements for municipal secur-
ities.
A listing of the different types of long-term municipal debt
.which could reasonably reach the market would include bonds,
certificates of indebtedness and notes. The thrust of this note is
directed against bond issues since they constitute the most com-
mon type of long-term municipal debt, but the arguments could
be applied against all three and perhaps more. Also, while the term
"municipal securities" is used to identify this particular segment
of the market, it is meant to include not only securities issued by
communities, but also states, special taxing districts and others
which are included within the 1933 Act exemption.
I. THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET
As was done in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the method of identify-
ing municipal securities is by identifying the issuer. Under the
terms of the legislation defining these as "exempt securities" are
generally included securities issued by the United States or its
instrumentalities, states and territories, their political subdivi-
sions and their agencies.'" This definition is not completely accur-
ate without a consideration of the specific type of security.
See Wall Street Journal, Nov. 6, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
, The Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970) provides:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchap-
[Vol. 78
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There are many systems of classification of municipal debt.
These would include classification by form (the type of instrument
evidencing the debt), the purpose for which the debt was issued,
the governmental functions for which the debt is used, the govern-
mental entity incurring the debt, the period for which the debt is
to be outstanding, and the nature of the security pledged for pay-
ment of the interest and principle."
Among these classifications perhaps the most important to the
investor is the classification based upon the specific resource used
ter shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(2) Any security issued or guaranteed by the United States or any terri-
tory thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or by any state of the United
States, or by any political subdivision of a State or Territory, or by any
public instrumentality of one or more States or territories, or by any
person controlled or supervised by and acting as an instrumentality of the
Government of the United States pursuant to authority granted by the
Congress of the United States; or any certificate of deposit for any of the
foregoing; ... or any security which is an industrial development bond
(as defined in section 103(c)(2) of Title 26) the interest on which is ex-
cludable from gross income under section 103(a)(1) of Title 26 if, by
reason of the application of paragraph (4) or (6) of section 103(c) of Title
26 (determined as if paragraphs (4)(A), (5), and (7) were not included in
such section 103(c)), paragraph (1) of such section 103(c) does not apply
to such security . ...
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970)
provides:
The term "exempted security" or "exempted securities" includes securi-
ties which are direct obligations of or obligations guaranteed as to princi-
pal or interest by the United States; such securities issued or guaranteed
by corporations in which the United States has a direct or indirect inter-
est as shall be designated for exemption by the Secretary of the Treasury
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors; securities which are direct obligations of or obligations guaran-
teed as to principal or interest by a State or any political subdivision
thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of a State or any political
subdivision thereof, or by any municipal corporate instrumentality of one
or more States; or any security which is an industrial development bond
(as defined in section 103(c)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) the
interest on which is excludable from gross income under section 103(a)(1)
of such Code if, by reason of the application of paragraph (4) or (6) of
section 103(c) of such Code (determined as if paragraphs (4)A, (5), and
(7) were not included in such section 103(c)), paragraph (1) of such sec-
tion 103(c) does not apply to such security. . ..
1, L. MOAK, AwMINISTRATION OF LOcAL GOVERNMENT DEBT 39 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as MOAK].
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to guarantee repayment. The most often used system is one devel-
oped by the Securities Industry Association." Under this system
there are four types of bonds.
"General obligation" bonds are secured by the issuer's full
faith, credit and taxing power. 3 It is the general promise to pay
which is the guarantee given to the purchaser. General obligation
bonds generally require authorization of the taxpayers 4 and may
be further limited by a maximum legal tax rate which is set by
some higher authority. 5 In this case, the bonds are still general
obligation bonds, but are termed "limited tax" bonds.
A second class is the "special tax" bond which is repaid from
the proceeds of a particular tax. 6 A part of this class is the "special
assessment" bond which is repayable from an assessment against
those who benefit from the facilities built with the bond revenues.
If special tax bonds are also secured by the full faith, credit and
taxing power of the issuer, they are classified as general obligation
bonds.
"Revenue" bonds are secured by the proceeds derived from
the facilities constructed with the bond issue.' Like the previous
elass, if the full faith, credit and taxing power of the issuer are also
pledged, the bonds are termed general obligation bonds.
The SEC originally held the use of the proceeds from the sale
of bonds for the construction of facilities to be used by private,
profit-making enterprise not to be a municipal bond within the
exemption of the 1933 or 1934 Acts even if the issuer was one
included in the exemption section.8 Congress responded by pas-
sage of an additional section of the 1933 Act, returning the exemp-
tion if the proceeds were used for the purposes specified in section
103(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, defining an industrial devel-
opment bond." This finally resulted in an SEC Act Release which
,2 See A. RABiNowrrz, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION 137 (1969).
" SECURITIES INVESTORS ASSOCIATION, FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 3 (9th
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as FUNDAMENTALS].
" See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-4 (1972).
, See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-14 (1972).
" FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 3.
17 Id.
" Securities Act Rule 131, 17 C.F.R. § 230.131 (1975).
" 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(2) (1970); see note 10 supra.
[Vol. 78
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defines the limits a revenue bond may reach and still retain its
exemption."0
The fourth class is the "New Housing Authority" bond. 2 They
are issued by local public housing authorities and secured by the
net rental revenues so, in one sense, they are similar to revenue
bonds. However, they are also secured by the full faith of the
United States since the Public Housing Authority must make con-
tributions which, together with the local funds, will be sufficient
to pay the principle and interest on the bonds.22
Under the system used by the Bureau of the Census there are
only two classes.23 Full-faith and credit debt is long-term debt for
which the credit of the government, implying the power of taxa-
tion, is unconditionally pledged. It includes debt payable from
specific taxes or nontax sources, but also represents liability pay-
able from any other available resources if the pledged sources are
insufficient. Nonguaranteed debt consists of long-term debt pay-
able solely from earnings of revenue producing activities, from
special assessments, or from specific nonproperty taxes.
The actual selling of municipal securities is usually handled
by bond dealers who act as underwriters. 24 Very few municipal
issues, unlike corporate securities, are privately placed.2 Also,
many states require competitive bidding in the issuance of general
obligation bonds.28 The underwriters do not charge a commission,
but their profits come from the "spread," which is the difference
between the price they pay to the issuer and the price they receive
from the purchaser.Y In corporate bond issues this spread is
usually between 1 and 2 per cent of the face value of the bonds.2
In the municipal bond market, due to the inability to equate even
bonds of the same issue because they are often offered serially or
20 Securities Act Release No. 33-5103, November 6, 1970, CCH Fed. Secur. L.
Rep. 77,924.
2, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 4.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1421a (1970).
2 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENT FINANCES IN 1965-66, 53 (1966).
24 Hearings on H.R. 4570 before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection
and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong. 1st Sess., ser. 14, at 53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Hearings].
2 Id.
2' See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972).
27 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 9.
28 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 9.
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at a discount or premium, 9 no accurate computations can be
made. One estimate is that the spread runs from 1/4 of 1 per cent
to 2 per cent of the face value depending on the expected difficulty
the underwriter will have in placing the bonds with purchasers."
Some few issues may exceed this 2 per cent figure. Because of the
risk involved in estimating this difficulty and the heavy capital
commitment, dealers often participate as a syndicate and submit
a collective bid.2 '
There are presently estimated to be 510 firms and 173 banks
dealing in the municipal bond market2 serving the 78,267 govern-
mental units in this country (excluding the United States govern-
ment and governmental agencies at all levels).33 In 1973 these deal-
ers handled over $22,735,000,000 of new long-term issues and
$24,640,000,000 of new short-term issues for the various municipal
issuers.3
The secondary municipal securities market is relatively un-
known.3 Due to the nature of the security, there is no national
quotation system" and the only quantity figures, those of a trade
publication, are considered misleading since most transactions are
.arried out using personal methods of communication and also,
there is no real advantage to a dealer in accurately reporting his
sales and inventory figures.2 7
The ownership of municipal bonds rests primarily in three
groups. In 1971 commercial banks held 49.8 per cent of the more
than $166.6 billion of outstanding municipal debt or $82.9 billion.
Households (individuals) held 31.4 per cent or $52.3 billion, while
fire and casualty insurance companies held 11.6 per cent or $19.3
11 A "serial" bond issue is one in which each bond or groups of bonds mature
at a date different from the others. A "discount" or "premium" is the difference in
the price paid for the bond which is less than or greater than the bond's face value.
This difference is usually caused by a change in the interest rate demanded by the
investors between the time the bonds are printed and the time they are sold.
1 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 10.
31 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 53.
22 Id. at 79.
Id. at 82.
, Id. at 84-9.
= The last complete study was, apparently, I. FRIEND, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER
SECURrrms MARKmrS (1958).
11 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
31 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 57.
[Vol. 78
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billion2 The figure for individual investors fell in percentage terms
during the previous ten year period from about 39.4 percent to the
31.4 per cent figure cited, but in dollar terms rose from $28.3 billion
to $52.3 billion. 9 During this same period, the total outstanding
volume of municipal debt rose from $71 billion to $166.6 billion for
an increase of 135% while the national debt (the debt of the federal
government alone) rose 50% and corporate debt rose 150%. 4°
M. PRESENT REGULATIONS
Aside from distinctions between the municipal and corporate
securities markets based upon taxation of dividends and the me-
chanics of underwriting, the major difference is in the regulation
by the federal government and the resulting flow of information to
the purchaser. A corporate securities issuer must file a registration
statement with the SEC prior to selling his securities on the public
market4 ' which is highly structured as to content, 2 give a portion
of this statement (the prospectus) to each purchaser," be closely
regulated as to advertising the sale," be held strictly liable for any
material misstatement of fact in the registration statement,4" (all
under the 1933 Act), and be subject to continuing disclosure re-
quirements48 (under the 1934 Act). However, the municipal securi-
ties issuer is expressly excused from complying with these regula-
tions.47 The 1933 Act is only applicable to municipal issues in an
after-the-fact manner under the general fraud provisions48 and the
1934 Act follows suit with an exemption of similar effect.4" The
information which a municipal issuer must provide is primarily
controlled by industry custom." To date, there has been no federal
legislation on the subject.
Id. at 50.
36 See, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 25.
o 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 49.
" Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1970).
4 Securities Act of 1933, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970).
'3 Securities Act of 1933, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1970).
" Securities Act of 1933, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1970).
" Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
46 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
' See note 10 supra.
s 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 60.
4 See note 10 supra.
o While there is sometimes a requirement under state law for advertising the
bond sale the content of the advertisement is not controlled. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 13-1-21 (1972).
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The primary reason for the absence of municipal bond
regulation (in the 1933 Act) is politics." It is indeed strange that
Congress, while stating such an inspiring purpose for the 1933 Act
regulations,52 applying it to such a broad range of money instru-
ments"5 and facing the knowledge that fraud and misrepresen-
tation had occurred in the municipal securities markets," would
withhold protection from the investors in municipal securities.
However, when faced with the objections of state and local govern-
ments, this is exactly what occurred.
When reading the legislative history of the 1934 Act, the indi-
cations of strong opposition by the issuers are again evident."
While many of the objections to specific terms of the regulatory
scheme, which originally did not exempt municipal securities at
"' Dean James A. Landis, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission at the
time the 1933 Act was enacted by Congress has written that the draftsmen had
originally contemplated no exemption at all for municipal bonds, but they "were
made exempt for obvious political reasons." Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 29, 39 (1959).
52 See note 7 supra.
As originally defined by Congress, the term security included:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebteness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certificate, certifi-
cate of interest in property, tangible or intangible, or, in general, any
instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(2) (1970).
As amended the term security means:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebted-
ness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscrip-
tion, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security" or any certificate of interest or partici-
pation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of,
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(2) (1970), formerly ch. 38, Title
I, § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
1, Hearing on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. at 232 (1933).
51 Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 3rd Sess. at 12 (1934).
[Vol. 78
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all, appeared quite valid, the arguments which possibly resulted
in the complete exemption dealt with the cost of filing registration
statements. 6 Conspiciously lacking in the discussion was any indi-
cation of a major concern for the protection of the investor.
The next opportunity for change came in 1938 with the pas-
sage of the Maloney Act, which created section 15A of the 1934 Act
requiring self-regulation of over-the-counter markets through a
national securities dealers' organization.57 Again came the argu-
ments from the issuers and again came an exemption." This time
the exemption applied to the municipal securities dealers who had
been exempted under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The apparent rea-
sons given were that there was such a close connection that regula-
tion would strongly affect the municipal issuers themselves. 9
Finally, in 1975, came the first attempt to regulate the mar-
ket. The Municipal Securities Exchange Act of 197560 brought the
dealers engaged solely in transactions in municipal securities (who
had been exempted before) within section 15 of the 1934 Act and
created the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (under the
SEC) to oversee their activities. There is, amazingly, no indication
in the legislative history of the 1975 Act of any of the broad based
opposition that was apparent in the previous securities enact-
ments. Indeed, there is some sign of a desire to go further and
regulate the issuers themselves.'
IV. THE CONSTITUTION
Constitutionality is a basic issue in any discussion of a federal
activity. In the area of municipal securities regulations there is no
case law to guide the discussion since there has been no previous
regulation. Also, very few, if any, activities of a state or local gov-
ernment are analogous to their participation in the securities mar-
ket. However, the argument on a related subject, that the federal
government lacks the power to tax municipal securities, may be
applicable. The doctrine of "reciprocal immunity", first stated in
51 Comment, Municipal Bonds and the Federal Securities Laws: The Results
of Forty Years of Indirect Regulation, 28 VAND. L. REV. 561, 585 (1975).
15 U.S.C. § 78oA(m) (1970).
Hearings on S. 3255 and H.R. 9634 before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. at 12 (1938).
59 Id.
60 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-84 (Supp. 1976).
", 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 62, 65.
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McCulloch v. Maryland"2 in 1819, states that the state government
cannot interfere in the affairs of the federal government 3 through
the imposition of taxes on federal revenues and activities, and
implies that the federal government cannot interfere in the affairs
of the state government in this manner.64 Each is sovereign. Later
cases considered this argument that the power to tax state activi-
ties would give the federal government the power to control them.,'
In the municipal securities area an argument of excessive control
due to registration requirements: might be answered in several
ways. First, the area of control is specifically given to Congress
under the commerce clause of the Constitution. That the securities
market falls within this clause as affecting interstate commerce
has been repeatedly stated by the courts." Secondly, the specific
prohibition against the use of the mails for the purpose of selling
or offering securities has also been upheld by the courts under the
Constitutional authority to create and regulate the postal system."7
Third, legislation requiring a municipal issuer to register gives no
power of control, although some of the present "undertakings"
(promises) which the SEC requires corporate issuers to make6
might have this effect and be unconstitutional if applied to munic-
ipal issuers. Finally, the present application of section 12(a) liabil-
ity under the 1933 Act, which removes the "protection" of requir-
ing the difficult charge of common law fraud to be proved against
a municipal issuer, is a minimal type of regulation which is already
in existence. The application of this section to municipal issuers
has been upheld by the courts," so it should be constitutionally
permissible to place municipal issuers in the same class as corpo-
rate issuers for all registration and regulation purposes if they can
now be placed there for a limited purpose. The final adjudication
of this problem will require a determination of the extent of the
tenth amendment reservation of power to the states as opposed to
the extent of power given Congress under the commerce clause.
62 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
" Id. at 436.
Id. at 430, 436.
See, e.g., The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871); National Life
Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928).
" See, e.g., Oklahoma-Texas Trust v. SEC, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939).
17 See e.g., Bogy v. United States, 96 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1938).
15 U.S.C. § 771(a) (1970).
6, See, e.g., Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
[Vol. 78
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V. THE NEED FOR REGULATION
In determining whether municipal securities should be regu-
lated, the basic question should be "What makes them different
from other types of securities?" rather than "What makes them
the same?" Aside from distinctions which may be drawn in the
mechanics of the distribution process or those based upon legisla-
tive action such as exemption from registration or the tax exemp-
tion, which have no real effect on the nature of the instrument
itself, there is no substantive difference. Regardless of the identity
of the issuer, the security still represents money invested by an
individual or institutional investor with the expectation of a profit.
These expectations can only be based upon a knowledge by the
investor of the apparent abilities and reputation of the issuer, the
purposes for which the input of money is sought, and an educated
guess as to the future ability of the issuer to repay the debt under
the terms originally set forth. As applied to corporate securities,
these requirements for information were recognized and set forth
in Schedule A of the 1933 Act.70 The importance of information
from governments is shown by the inclusion of Schedule B, al-
though this was limited in application to foreign governments.7 '
Assuming the Congress was correct in not including municipal
securities within the provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the sheer
volume of the present market would now require a re-examination.
In 1933 new issues of long-term debt of state and municipalities
totaled $1.1 billion.72 This figure did not change significantly until
1947 at which time it had doubled.73 Almost every year since 1947
has represented growth and the 1973 level reached almost $23 bil-
lion.74 In just the period from 1960 to 1971 the outstanding debt
rose from $71 billion to almost $167 billion.7"
The change in ownership of municipal issues has not under-
gone any substantial changes-at least not since 1947.76 During
this period individual ownership has stayed around the 35 per cent
,' 15 U.S.C. § 77aa, Schedule A (1970).
" Id. Schedule B.
" 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 84.
,' Id. at 85.
74 Id.
,' Id. at 49.
" Id. 50; FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 25.
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figure, rising as high as 43 per cent and falling as low as 30 per
cent.77
That Congress is unaware of any problem cannot be argued
since the need for disclosure has been presented to them. It has
been implicitly recognized by the SEC78 and explicitly stated in
testimony by investors." The only group that resists the enactment
of regulations is the issuers." Even the dealers showed concern over
the wording of the Municipal Securities Act of 1975, apparently on
the ground that the specific language denying the newly created
Board any power to require issuers to provide more information
would restrict the flow of information already available by reaf-
firming the issuer's unique status.'
In the absence of more accurate information, one test for the
existence and extent of misrepresentation by municipal issuers is
the record of judicial decisions. A survey of this record indicates
that, unlike the corporate securities industry, fraud or misrepre-
sentations were not numerous until recently. The first major oc-
currence of misrepresentation was not adjudicated until 1954 and
1955. It involved the sale of revenue bonds of the Bellevue Ne-
braska Bridge Commission and was decided in a series of five
cases. " The investors had purchased the bonds relying on false and
misleading information contained in an offering circular prepared
by the Commission and on oral statements made by an individual
seller.
In a 1962 case, Texas Continental Life Insurance Co. v.
Dunne, the municipal issuer sold a revenue bond issue in exchange
for a cash payment and a promissory note payable by installments.
The note also contained a provision allowing the payments to be
made in cash or by transfer of the bonds to the holder of the note.
The plaintiff subsequently purchased a portion of the bonds from
the original buyer and, when the original buyer defaulted the city
71 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 25.
7, 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 62.
71 Id. at 107.
" Id. at 103.
Id. at 95.
82 Barrons v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Connecticut Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Citizens Casualty
Co. of New York v. Shields, [1954 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
90,683 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Greenwich Savings Bank v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 368
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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was without funds to build the facilities whose revenues would
have allowed repayment of the bonds. The plaintiff then brought
suit since he had not been told of the repayment provisions and
the ordinance authorizing the bond issue made no mention of it."
Other recent cases involve misrepresentation by both the issuer
and the dealer. 4
While the reported cases are few in number, tending to indi-
cate the fraud problem is not widespread, this is possibly not an
accurate assessment of the situation. In testimony before a House
Committee the SEC characterized the problems at all levels of the
municipal securities industry as "substantial" and cited its own
small staff as the reason it did not bring more enforcement ac-
tions. 5
While active or inadvertent misrepresentation on the part of
the issuer is cause for alarm, the most disastrous experience for the
investor must be a "default" in the payment of the principle or
interest. In the postwar period, until 1965, there have been an
estimated 30 defaults" of which three, West Virginia Turnpike
Commission bonds, Chicago Skyway bonds and Chesapeake Bay
Bridge and Tunnel bonds have been considered major.87 "Major"
must be considered a relative term since the first two named
amounted to $234 million. 8
The primary argument raised against any required disclosure
is that the cost of public facilities would be increased by the added
expense. While this is undoubtedly true over the short run, over a
greater period of time the information released (if favorable) would
reduce the underwriter's risk by making placement much easier
and lower the "spread" they now demand.88 Secondly, the informa-
tion investors require is, for the most part, not that type which
would have to be developed specifically for the purposes of selling
bonds. It is information already in existence, but located in diverse
307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962).
" See, e.g., In Re Walston & Co. and Harrington, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T 77,474 (SEC 1967).
" 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 62.
" JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIC FACILITY NEEDS AND
FINANCING, 89th Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. 2, 243-247 (1966).
U 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 47.
A. RABINOWITZ, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION 78 (1969).
See text accompanying note 27 supra.
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sources, some of which are available only to the issuer." Finally,
under the present terms of the 1933 Act certain small issues,9 '
privately placed issues,92 and issues sold only within one state3 are
excused from registration. These same exemptions could be ap-
plied to municipal securities just as they are presently applied to
corporate issuers.
In discussing whether federal disclosure standards are re-
quired it is important to consider the present, unofficial, systems.
Potentially the most important are the private bond rating compa-
nies which include such nation-wide rating firms as Moody's Inves-
tors Service and Standard and Poor's Corporation94 and many
smaller regional and state bond rating firms. 5 Even though private
bond rating companies exert a great deal of influence over bond
sales" and interest rates,97 their ability to force disclosure must be
90 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 103.
11 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. 77c(b) (1970).
'I Id.
'2 Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. 77c(a)(11) (1970).
" Moody's Investors Service generally rates bonds of more than $600,000 with
some additional exceptions. Their rating symbols are:
Aaa Best quality
Aa High Quality
A Higher medium quality
Baa Lower medium grade
Ba Contains speculative elements
B Lacks qualities of a desirable investment
Caa Poor
Ca Very speculative
C Lowest rating.
FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 26.
Standard and Poor's Corporation will rate government bonds for a fee. Their
symbols are:
AAA Prime
AA High grade
A Upper medium grade
BBB Medium grade
BB Lower medium grade
B Speculative
CCC Defaults
Cc
C
Id. at 27.
Is For example, Municipal Advisory Council of Michigan, Ohio Municipal
Council, and the Tennessee Taxpayers Asssciation. MOAK, supra note 11, at 152.
16 The most direct sales result of the rating occurred when the Controller of the
Currency, controlling national banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
[Vol. 78
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questioned, due to their small staffs of personnel which lack the
ability to determine the accuracy of the information upon which
the ratings are based."
The second major unofficial system suggested as a possible
solution to the disclosure problem is that of the national dealor's
organization. 9 The motivating force behind this system is simply
that access to the market place would be limited if strict compli-
ance if there was not strict compliance. A list of items that should
be disclosed for revenue bonds'0 " and a separate listing for all other
types is provided.'"' Also given are forms for continuing disclosure
divided in this same manner.' 02 The issuers' organization, the
Municipal Finance Officers Association, recognizing the effect of
bond ratings and reputation on sales and interest rates, has
adopted these check lists in large part'0' and adds a list of people
and organizations to whom the information should be sent.0 4 Un-
fortunately, this disclosure is apparently not required by the deal-
controlling its member banks, the Federal Reserve Systein, controlling member
banks, and the Executive Committee of the National Association of Supervisors of
State Banks, who influence everything else, announced a joint policy in 1949 which
limits bank investments to the bonds given the top four ratings (Aaa, Aa, A, and
Baa, or AAA, AA, A, and BBB). FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 27. Of course, a
low rating or even a lack of a rating would influence most buyers.
11 FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 28.
0 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 53.
00 Securities Investment Association, publishers of FUNDAMENTALS. This was
previously published by the Investment Bankers Association which merged with the
SEA in 1972.
'O FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 158.
"I Id. at 154.
"I2 Id. at 92.
'0' MOAK, supra note 11, at 352.
,"I Id. at 446, n.10. The list includes:
a. The Bond Buyer.
b. The Wall Street Journal.
c. The public press in the community and nearby.metropolitan areas.
d. Standard and Poor's Corporation.
e. Moody's Investors Services.
f. Dun & Bradstreet.
g. Committee on Valuation of Securities of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners.
h. Any statewide bond or debt reporting service.
i. Banking Commissions and state insurance departments.
j. Governments Division, Bureau of the Census.
k. Each investment banking firm that has bid on bonds of the issuer
within the past 5 years.
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ers and is apparently not voluntarily given by all issuers. 0
In passing the Securities Act of 1933 Congress created three
sections which create liability for the issuance of securities under
fraudulent conditions. The first of these, section 11, applies to
those who must file a registration statement prior to the selling
effort.' 6 Since municipal issues are exempted from this require-
ment'0 1 this section is inapplicable to them. Section 12 would
apply, by its terms, to everyone who sells or offers to sell a security;
however, of all the groups exempted in section 3 of the Act, only
municipal issuers are exempted from this section.' 8 It is only under
section 17(a) that municipal issuers share liability with everyone
else.
Under the terms of section 17(a),'19 the SEC could
conceivably, by utilizing the definition powers granted it in section
19," '0 require disclosure on the part of a municipal issuer. Simply
by declaring the publication of any information without full and
complete disclosure accompanying it to be an "omission of mate-
rial fact,""' effective disclosure could be attained. This possible
use of its powers has been noted by the SEC, but it recognizes the
limitations set by the legislative history of the 1933 Act on any
control of the municipal securities market.""
Under the terms of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 every
issuer is required to file with the Commission periodic disclosure
1. Each of the principle banks in the region and in each financial center
in the nation.
m. Associations of investors (e.g. banks, insurance companies, etc.)
n. Investment Bankers Association.
o. Municipal Finance Officers Association.
p. Local Chambers of Commerce, taxpayers associations and principle
civic organizations in the community.
q. Bond counsel for all issues of outstanding debt.
r. State departments of municipal and community affairs.
s. Councils of governments, regional planning groups, and other local
governments in the area-especially those with overlapping debt.
"'5 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 68.
15 U.S. C. § 77k (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970).
Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 77q(e) (1970).
15 U.S. C. § 77s(a) (1970).
Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) (1970).
"' 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 60.
[Vol. 78
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reports."' However, municipal securities are again exempted 4 and
the legislative history prevents any other possible interpretations
which would bring about disclosure.'
The Municipal Securities Act of 1975 places a burden upon
dealers to give complete and accurate information to the purchas-
ers in all municipal securities transactions."' Indirect pressure
could be placed upon the issuers by requiring certain information
of the dealers and deeming it to be an omission of material infor-
mation if not disclosed. Since the best, and perhaps only, source
of information for the dealer would be the issuer of the particular
security involved, the issuer's refusal to disclose information to the
dealer would render the dealer powerless to sell the securities and,
thus, make the securities unmarketable. However, the legislative
history of the Act would preclude such indirect regulation."7
The development and discussion of the many different items
of information for which an investor would have a reasonable need
before purchasing municipal securities is beyond the scope of this
note. In determining what information should be disclosed, the
relationship between this type security and corporate securities, as
relates to the informational needs of the investor, should be recog-
nized. In both instances the basic concern of the investor is the
ability of the issuer to generate funds and apply those funds to
liquidate debts. The corporate issuer attempts to generate funds
by providing goods and services and then charging its customers a
price. In municipal terms, for an issue of general obligation bonds,
the service provided is government and the price exacted is tax.
In the corporate world the factors which affect the issuer's
ability to generate funds, all of which are items required by Con-
gress or the SEC to be disclosed, include competitive conditions
in the industry, ' the blacklog of orders for the product or serv-
ices,"' the dependence upon a single customer or supplier, 2 1 the
seasonal nature of the business' and the abilities and reputations
"' Securities Act of 1934, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
"' Securities Act of 1934, § 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (1970).
1 See note 55 supra.
"' 15 U.S.C.A. § 780-84 (Supp. 1976).
"' See note 61 supra.
" 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, Item 9(a)(1).
"' Id. Item 9(a)(4).
110 Id. Item 9(a)(2), (5).
121 Id. Item 9(a)(4).
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of the management.' In determining the ability of the entity to
apply the funds to liquidation of debts, factors such as structure
and other outstanding debts,' and expected growth through de-
velopment of new products' 2 (possibly showing other needs for the
funds), benefits given to promoters, 21 underwriters and others,' 2
and the nature and extent of transactions between the manage-
ment and corporation'2 (possibly showing a lack of desire or intent
to repay the debts) become important. Obviously, these same fac-
tors, at least under the names given, cannot be applied to munici-
pal securities of the general obligation type.
Since the investor must ultimately look to the taxable wealth
of the citizens for repayment, he will be most concerned with those
factors which will affect the size of this wealth. As a starting point
the investor will use the present tax base. As important as the size
of the tax base is the method used to determine value.'1 To this
base figure will be applied information which will tend to indicate
possible growth or decline in the tax base. The sources of wealth
of the taxing district, whether it is a manufacturing, service or
residential community, the age and physical condition of facilities,
the relationship of the local industry to the regional and national
economy, and population trends will reveal whether the area is
growing or decaying. Community characteristics such as the edu-
cation level of the citizens and the educational, cultural, and recre-
ational opportunities offered, patterns of growth of the surrounding
areas and social problems will indicate the ability of the com-
munity to attract new growth.
The investor is not only concerned with the wealth of the
community, but also the issuer's ability to tax it. Such items of
information as legal limits on taxation and liabilities of other tax-
ing districts which look to this same wealth for their revenues are
important for this consideration.
The capacity of the issuer to apply the tax revenues to repay-
ment of the particular debt in question will be revealed by the level
122 Id. Item 16(a), (b), (d).
121 Id. Item 5.
" Id. Item 9(a)(7)(a).
121 Id. Item 8.
12 Id. Item 1.
"I Id. Item 20.
121 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 110.
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and repayment conditions of other debts, the amount of excess
revenue above that required for the services provided to the citi-
zens, and items which reveal the general quality and reputation of
the government or other issuing authority.12
When the issue in question is a special tax bond, the investor
will focus his attention on the wealth of the particular group to be
taxed or assessed and upon the factors affecting that base
amount. 3' When the issue is a revenue bond, the investor will seek
the information about the business whose success or failure will
control the issuer's ability to repay the debt.' 3' In this situation the
investor is really placing his money in a security which would
otherwise be characterized as a corporate issue to which the munic-
ipal issuer is only lending his tax-free status.3 2
In addition to the factors mentioned above there is one addi-
tional area of risk apparently not fully realized by all investors in
municipal bonds. 13 While in the corporate bond market the inves-
tors, being creditors, have a superior claim to all others,", this
priority does not carry over into the municipal arena. Courts have
repeatedly held that the first priority for municipal revenues, prior
to the repayment of any outstanding debt, is for use in providing
governmental services.' 35 While the bond classification systems
given in this note are based upon the security pledged, there may
not be any security at all.
VI. CONCLUSION
Investors in the municipal bond market are seeking a return
on their investment just as other investors in other markets are
doing. They have placed their money, totaling millions, in the
'1 For a complete discussion of these and other items of interest to the investor
see MOAK, supra note 11, at 157; FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 35; A. RABINOW-
rrz, MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION 136 (1969).
I' See note 15 supra.
131 FUNDAMANTALS, supra note 13, at 49; MOAK, supra note 11, at 175.
' "When local or state government embark upon enterprises that are to be
financed from user charges, essentially they are entering the field of business."
MOAK, supra note 11, at 176.
"3 1975 House Hearings, supra note 24, at 111.
,3" H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 155 at 277, § 383 at 822 & n.19 (2d ed.
1970).
's See, e.g., Borough of Fort Lee v. U.S. ex rel Baker, 104 F.2d 275 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 629 (1939); Town of Mt. Vernon v. General Electric Supply
Corp., 289 Ky. 355, 158 S.W.2d 649 (1942).
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hands of federal, state and local government officials and by doing
so have given up the protections offered by Congress to the inves-
tors in other areas. If there was a sound basis for this exclusion in
1933, the change in values caused by the present volume of this
market would now require at least a re-examination. If there was
political motivation in 1933, whatever its reason, the events of the
intervening forty-three years are also a sufficient basis for review.
While disclosure on the part of some municipal issuers is pres-
ently practiced, either due to direct pressures from the dealers or
due to indirect pressures from supervising agencies of certain
groups of investors, the results cannot be said to be uniform or to
sufficiently reveal what is needed. The argument that the extra
costs of forced disclosure under the 1933 and 1934 Acts makes the
use of the bond revenues for public purposes too expensive is mean-
ingless at best. The costs of assembling the data would be
substantially the same for any official system as for present unoffi-
cial systems, and while the expense of bond counsel might be a
major factor, demands placed upon bond counsel by dealers'30 and
the courts'3 1 to investigate and disclose facts surrounding a bond
issue for which they prepare a letter opinion will cause the costs
to approach that for a corporate issue. The other item of expense,
the SEC registration fee, can only be considered minor.'
The other result of removing the municipal exemption would
be to bring into play the liabilities sections of the securities legisla-
tion, giving investors additional protection against the use of false
or misleading information given by the issuer.
To evaluate the merits of any argument raised against the
imposition of registration and disclosure requirements for munici-
pal issuers, one must remember that those who finance
government are deserving of at least as much protection as those
who finance industry.
Daniel R. Schuda
' FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 13, at 128.
,31 See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
'M The 1933 Act imposes a fee of one fiftieth of one per centum of the aggregate
price at which the securities are to be offered with a minimum of $100. For a
$1,000,000 issue this fee would be only $200. Securities Act of 1933, § 6(b)2; 15
U.S.C. § 77f(b) (1970).
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